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Whatever happened to “sin”?   The concept itself, so integral and central to the 
Western theological tradition, has faded away over the most recent decades and 
centuries as even a topic for serious contention.  While perduring and persistent 
among Christian conservatives, especially the expansive and highly diverse global 
population that has come to be labelled by sociologists of religion as 
“evangelicalism,” the term has gradually succumbed to a dearth of effective 
meaning and has been replaced by a variety of religiously neutral constructs, 
implying moral failure, psychological or behavior disorder, or political infamy.  Even 
once trendy imaginaries as “collective sin”, a redeployment of the Augustinian 
notion of “original sin” (peccatum originalis) favored by Reformed thinkers, while 
lent a socio-political tweak by Reinhold Niebuhr1, has given way to various critico-
theoretical adaptations, including such capacious locutions as “patriarchy” or 
“systemic racism.”  In many respects the notion of “sin” in the strict sense, rather 
than with attention to specific defects in either individual character or conduct, has 
gradually converged with the general concept of “injustice”, or plain old-fashioned 
“wrongness.”   
However, if one harks back to the classical context in which the word itself 
first emerged, the diffuse contemporary and apparent ancient meanings seem 
strangely to coalesce.  Early Christianity adopted the syntactics of its era and over 
time refined – or perhaps we should say overdetermined – it in such a way that it 
slowly became disembedded from common discourse. It is our unique Western 
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theological – and Christological – heritage that begins with the apostle Paul that 
can account for this very odyssey of its overdetermination.  The upshot of this long 
evolutionary process, which at the same time has also contributed to a demise in 
the relevance of the expression, is that the problem of “sin” has remained a 
theological one. By the same token, the presumably secular issue of “justice” has 
over time become a privileged topic for philosophical inquiry and argumentation.  In 
the paragraphs that follow I will attempt to lay the groundwork for meeting what 
we may take as a twenty-first century discursive challenge of healing the breach 
between the theological and philosophical tasks, particularly those of a political 
philosophy.  In other words, I will aim to realign the syntax of sin and redemption 
with new trajectories discussions of justice that sketch the general framework for 
a critical political theology focused on “social justice”, even though I do not make 
that particular move within these narrower horizons. But first we need to examine 
the etiology of the discourse of sin and its cognates overall, especially in its original 
settings. 
The term “sin” (Sünde in German, zonde in Dutch, péché in French, etc.) is the 
routine English translation of the ancient Greek word hamartia, which can be found 
in both Aristotle and the tragic playwright.  Hamartia is exploited in the Septuagint 
to render the Hebrew chata’ah.  Both the Hebrew and the Septuagint equivalent 
have the semantic force of “making a mistake” or “missing the mark.”  In Greek 
hamartia connotes an arrow falling short of its intended target.  The same inflection 
can be found in Aristotle’s Poetics when he associates hamartia with the hero’s 
“tragic flaw.” 2  In all these illustrations there is a profound recognition that the 
“mistake”, or “error”, should not be understood as a mere failure of personal 
agency, but is made intelligible within a broader temporal frame of reference within 
which serious and decisive consequences unfold from the deed itself.  In short, 
hamartia entails the entire field of action and interaction in which the mistake or 
“failure” occurs.  The familiar idea of the hero’s “tragic flaw” (e.g., Achilles’ “heel” 
where he can be wounded by an arrow to which he is otherwise invulnerable) 
easily illustrates this sort of metonymical compression of both action and 
signification.  But it can also be found in the simple meme in Genesis 4:7 where “sin 
(chata’ah) is described by the Tanakh author as a “crouching beast” poised to spring 
on Cain, which of course actually happens once he goes out into the field and 
murders his brother.“ 
“Sin” from this wide perspective, therefore, can be construed as a kind of 
synecdoche for human fallibility.  In Jewish thought it is not so much the fallible 
nature of humanity that stands out (Throughout the Tanakh it is in fact a given),  but 
the inclination to “turn away” from the sovereign and sustaining power of God and 
rely on one’s own abilities or resources.  Thus “repentance” in the Hebrew Bible 
amounts to a turning back or “return” (teshuvah) to God away from whom one has 
previously turned away.3  Whereas in Greek thought overall the objective of an 
agent’s hamartia by which one “falls short” can be just about anything, within the 
Hebraic setting the failure itself is the direct result of someone disobeying, or 
refusing to heed the counsel of, the sovereign God who leads one on the path of 
“righteousness.”   
 
The Dialectic of Sin and Justice  
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A “dialectic” of sin, therefore, arises in the Hebraic world vision that 
produces an oscillation between the finite (and fallible) human will and the infinite  
(and infallible) divine purpose.   The “holiness” of God always stands in contrast 
with the willfulness and inconstancy of the free human agent.  Perhaps the most 
important Biblical passage in which this dialectic discloses itself in starkest 
contours occurs in the Christian New Testament – specifically, chapter 3 of Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans.  Here Paul sets up a dialectic between the “justice” 
(dikaiosyne) of God and that of humanity.  Although the Greek term dikaiosyne in 
the New Testament is conventionally translated as “righteousness,” it is exactly the 
same word that pervades the intricate argument of Plato’s Republic.4  While Plato in 
the Republic is concerned with finding a suitable homology between the “state” 
(polis) and the “soul” (psyche), Paul is preoccupied, perhaps because of his 
Pharisaic background, with the incommensurability between God’s “justice” and our 
own “injustice” (adikia).  Such incommensurability applies to both those whom God 
has “chosen” (that is, the Jewish people) and the pagans who are ignorant of who 
God genuinely is, even though in Romans 1 Paul makes it clear that even the latter 
have “no excuse” for their lack of understanding.  Paul’s focus in much of Romans is 
to work out a formula for how God’s elect could have rejected the very One who 
gave them life and sustains them, whereas the Gentiles who were never “called” in 
the first place could now become the bearers of the divine blessing.   But God’s 
different historical purposing of peoples turns out to be irrelevant when it comes to 
measuring what we mean by dikaiosyne.   “There is no difference between Jew and 
Gentile, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God”.5  
Here another major distinction appears in the design of the dialectic.  Human 
“sin” (hamartia) amounts to a “falling short” (hysterountai) because any human 
achievement itself, whether inconsequential or praiseworthy, is inadequate in 
comparison with divine “glory” (doxa).  The term doxa leaves a curious footprint 
with respect to the genealogy of its usage among the ancients.  The word, which 
derives from the verb dokein (“to seem,” “to appear”).  For Plato and Aristotle doxa 
bespoke a simple belief that had not been “justified” or sufficiently tested through 
the rationality of philosophical discussion.  By the Roman era the term had the 
general force of “honor” or “respect” or “glory,” adjectives assigned to noble and 
exceptional people.  It was with this “regal” meaning in mind that the translators of 
the Septaugint translated the Greek word kavod (“heavy”, “distinguished”, 
“majestic”) as doxa.   
While the Greek philosophers had construed dikaiosyne (Latin=iustitia) as the 
proper relationship among citizens of the polis, and by extensions the harmonic co-
ordination of the different functions of the human soul or psyche, when we arrive in 
Paul’s time it had acquired a more “personalized” set of implications.  Athenian 
democracy and Israelite theocracy had been swallowed up by Roman imperial 
power.  The only remaining polis in the first century A.D. was the Roman 
cosmopolis with Caesar as its head.  In the world of the Gospels the problem of 
“righteousness” was centered around how to live in keeping with the Mosaic law.  
The Pharisaic movement, beginning with the reign of the Hasmonean king John 
Hyrcanus in the middle of the second century BCE, was something of a “populist” 
initiative to ensure a functional Jewish state in which routine observance of Torah 
was fostered at a grass roots level by teachers capable of simplifying and 
interpreting the complex tradition,  formerly the province of aristocratic scribes, 
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while making it useful in everyday affairs.6  In a sense, as the historian Josephus 
himself noted in his Antiquities, the Pharisees were overall the Jewish equivalent of 
such popular pagan thinkers as such as Stoics, Cynics, and Epicureans, who made 
philosophy a lifestyle rather than an academic or esoteric pursuit.7  Like these 
thinkers, they regarded any kind of “spiritual” knowledge to be largely pragmatic 
and transactional.   In short, dikaiosyne itself had to be regarded not as divine gift 
or dispensation, but as a kind of garden variety moral calculus, an economy.   
Paul, a Pharisee, confesses in his letter to the Philippians that he had 
misunderstood dikaoisyne in this fashion.  The Pharisaic approach to dikaoisyne 
turns out to be mercantile in practice.  It treats the Mosaic Law as a strictly 
casuistic methodology, following what the Pharisees reportedly considered the 
“oral Torah”, undermining its soteriological function and exacerbating our “flesh” or 
sinful nature.  “If someone else thinks they have reasons to put confidence in the 
flesh, I have more: circumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe 
of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee; as for 
zeal, persecuting the church; as for righteousness based on the law, faultless.”8  
This version of dikaiosyne “based on the law” is amemptos (“faultless,” “blameless”, 
“beyond reproach”), also implying that its antonym (memptos) contrasts directly 
with the root meaning of hamartia as a shortcoming or mistake.   The ancient Greek 
word memptos insinuates a bad “performance” as in a stage play.  Paul’s point, as 
he makes elsewhere in his writings, is that “righteousness” (dikaiosyne remains 
impossible as any sort of act or performance), if by our moral conduct we are 
seeking to appear “blameless” in the presence of a transcendent and most “holy” 
God.  There is always something missing, something we have not done.  As the 
Calvinist adage runs, finitum non capax infiniti – the “finite is incapable of containing 
the infinite.”  If “justice” in the ancient Greek sense depends on a certain 
apportionment of the parts to the whole, we always end up with an utter 
disproportion among the elements in their relationship with infinitude.  That, in fact, 
turns out to be the very problem Paul addresses.  What kind of “infinite” justice can 
God, who is beyond our comprehension, demand of us? 
 
The Two Faces of “Justice” 
According to Jacques Ellul, a predicament arises from the binary character 
of “justice” in Hebraic thinking.  There are two words that are often used 
concomitantly – mishpat and tsedaquah – for what comes to be translated into 
Greek as dikaiosyne.  But once transposed back into English, the impersonal and 
personal meanings of these respective terms are captured in the words “justice” 
and “righteousness.”  According to Ellul, “mishpat means justice in the context of 
judging and leading. However, this may be interpreted in two different ways. For 
some, judging and leading gives rise to customs, laws, and justice in the human 
sense of that word.” Viewed from this standpoint, the term has far more 
ramifications that are often entailed in the familiar theory of “governing”.  It is also 
comparable to the Greek politeia, which Plato himself takes to be the cipher for the 
conceptual puzzle of what is meant by dikaoisyne, or “justice.” On the other 
hand, the root of tsedaquah “is the same as that of the Hebrew word for grace and 
justification. With tsedaquah we encounter the same duality of justice and grace. 
The condemnation is tied to the pardon. It is this relationship that makes this kind of 
justice and law very difficult to understand for us, because it implies the notions of 
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both pardon and justification.” 9  Ellul adds the important qualification that “God’s 
justice, whether it is tsedaquah or mishpat, always involves both possibilities 
together. Someone is both guilty and innocent, both sinner and blameless.”10   
Here we have an etiology of Luther’s famous dictum simul iustus et peccator, 
but note that this kind of dialectic, often attributable to Paul, can be traced back to 
the very tension inherent in the idea of “justice” embedded in the Tanak itself.  The 
tension is also present in Islam, and may be regarded as a dominant feature of the 
Abrahamic traditions together.  God’s iustitia by the logic of the non capax infintum 
must be regarded as both gratuitous and transactional.   It can account for the 
tension of divine love and mercy.  But it can only be carried out in the context of 
human customs and institutions, as entailed in the Greek locution nomos.  In Paul’s 
writings nomos routinely serves as the koine equivalent for “law”, as contrasted 
with “grace.”  Jesus’ almost obsessive condemnation of the Pharisees can be 
explained, therefore, as his realization that the Scriptural rather than the casuistic 
sense of Torah reflects this tension between tsedaquah and mishpat at a level that 
nomos, saturated with the pragmatics of the “oral Torah,” would not. Furthermore, 
the Pharisaic dispostion of nomos alchemizes the dialectics of grace and law into a 
computative enterprise, a type of moral “ledger” that merely balances out deeds 
and consequences rather than reveling in God’s infinite creative capacity.  
At the same time, this system of moral accounting shatters before the 
skandalon of the resurrected Jesus. Paul writes that “whatever were gains to me I 
now consider loss for the sake of Christ.”11  The terms “gain” (kerdē) and “loss” 
(kerdē) belong to accounting discourse.  However, the loss “for the sake of Christ” 
(dia ton Christon) suggests a qualitative transformation where the dialectic leads to 
what Hegelians would term a “sublation.”  The preposition dia in this context has the 
implication of “across” or “to the other side.”  What Paul substitutes for this ledger 
of gain and loss is the “knowledge of Christ” (gnōseōs Christou), a true 
“transvaluation of values” in the Nietzschean meaning of the phrase.12  The 
“knowledge of Christ” is one that resolves the dialectic of infinite and finite, one that 
“attains to the resurrection of the dead.”13  But, even more importantly, it is one that 
surpasses the transactional algebra from which the Pharisaic version of dikaiosyne 
is derived.  Paul declares that he considered all his gains as “garbage” (skybala), 
“that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own 
that comes from the law, but that which is through faith in Christ – the 
righteousness that comes from God on the basis of faith.”14 The dikaiosyne that 
“comes from God on the basis of faith” is pure “unmerited grace.”  It is what Luther 
called an “alien righteousness” (iustitia imputata) that cannot be earned, but must 
be received.   
At the same time, it is not our task here to clarify even more meticulously 
the reasoning of Luther and Calvin, or to rehash once more time the logic of 
Reformation dogmatics.  The point is that what Calvin in Book I of the Institutes 
refers to as the duplex cognitio Dei (the “double” or dialectical knowledge of God) 
arranges the scaffolding for the modern problem of justice as one of moral 
compulsion rather than a legal obligation.  In fact, it can be argued that the 
contemporary, post-Christian predilection among secular reformers to “establish 
justice”, not in the procedural but in a more substantive sense as we see among 
today’s so-called “social justice” movements, ultimately harks back to the Pauline 
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and Reformed dialectic of an infinite iustitia that can never be instantiated in any 
concrete set of community relations or political institutions, yet makes persistent, 
endless “critical” demands upon the existing norms of jurisprudence.   
Such a iustitia is not a concept but, as Derrida famously puts, a specter.  
“Injustice”, or “sin” in the dialectical, and not necessarily theological, formation of 
the concept derives straightaway from this sort of Derridean “hauntology.”  If, as 
Derrida writes in Specters of Marx, justice itself proves to be “undeconstructible,” 
then then very deconstructible apparatus by which law and justice function as a 
system of “policing” along with the administration of crime and punishment can 
never be perceived as iustus in the same manner that Luther’s “righteous” believer 
remains simultaneously a “sinner.”15    By definition the infinite is impervious to 
deconstruction.   
The finite, nevertheless, can indeed undergo deconstruction.  The “antinomy” 
of finite and infinite does not pose a metaphysical challenge so long as it is 
restricted to the sphere of religious, or “faith-based”, discourse.  But when faith 
itself is finitized – for example, in Kant’s “religion without religion” – the antinomy 
itself becomes increasingly problematic.  Divine justice crystallizes into a new and 
wholly immanent demand for a conformity of human behavior to the implacable 
ideal of iusitita in se, the passion of all secular authoritarians and totalitarians.   Or, 
as Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I was supposed to have remarked, fiat iustitia 
pereat mundus.  The theological question of “sin,” therefore, cannot be easily 
separated from a pure, principle-driven system of regulations founded on what 
Kant himself referred to as the “holiness” of the moral imperative.  The ethical 
eschaton is “immanentized” in a system of law and order that is bereft of any 
semblance of mercy or grace. 
The familiar distinction between “de-ontology” and “utility” has its genesis in 
this particular kind of “secularized” religious aporia.  One is Torah in the exacting 
sense, the other nomos.  The distinction manifests itself pointedly in Kant’s own 
efforts in adduce a “metaphysics” of justice from one of morality.  “Justice is 
therefore the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can 
be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of 
freedom.”16 Justice as nomos, that is, justice determined as “case law,” turns out to 
be meaningless in the Kantian version.  If we view through an historical lens the 
parallel iterations of the ideas of “sin” and “justice”, we find that both hamartia and 
dikaiosyne are used in a forensic fashion to represent authoritative “judgments”.  In 
Greek tragedy the judgment was rendered by the spectator.  The Hebrew “judges” 
who ruled over the twelve tribes were precisely as their title implies – they drew 
conclusions about how to interpret God’s will in settling disputes among aggrieved 
parties and in making executive decisions that would affect the people’s welfare 
across the board.  The concept of “sin”, therefore, as the Germanic root attests, is 
historically shaped within this forensic matrix of signification.   The intricate 
etymology of the English word “sin” (and the German Sünde) has evolved from both 
the proto-Germanic and from Latin parsings of the verbs “to be,” especially as 
occurs in the act of predication.17  Perhaps a modern English equivalent of these 
inflections and applications would be the expression “he’s the one”, that is, the one 
who stands out from everyone else, who is the perpetrator of an offense, or who 
has been found guilty in a court of law. 
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Technically, a “sinner” – or the one who commits a sin - is someone subject 
to a judicial proceeding.  But sin does not have to be forensic merely in the extrinsic 
sense of someone identified in an indictment.  The sinner must be seen as 
responsible for their action.  And the idea of “guilt”, as numerous philologists have 
speculated in view of the close association between the words “guilt” and “gold” 
(German=Geld) as well as the German homonym Schuld, which means both “debt” 
and “guilt”, implies a certain transactional arrangement, a closed economy.  In Salic, 
or Germanic law, the wergeld (or “man payment”) was a typical fine, or debt 
incurred, when a person was found culpable for a major crime, even homicide.  The 
debt was normally apportioned to the status of the person wronged.  The 
assignment of guilt rounds out the accusation that a person has committed a crime, 
and thus the “debt” also comes to be internalized.  If the “creditor” to whom the debt 
is owed happens to be an infinite personality, then the debt ipso facto proves 
impossible to pay off.  Saint Anselm’s notable treatise Cur Deus Homo (“Why God 
Became Man”), which seeks to explain the Incarnation as God’s own resolve to pay 
off the impossible debt of human sinfulness has become the centuries-old starting 
point for Christian “atonement theory”. It arises indirectly as well from the principle 
of finitum non capax infiniti.    
 
Homo Fallibilus 
According to Paul Riceour, however, the problem of sin cannot be overcome 
by any kind of judicial calculus, especially one founded on the suggestion of a 
“disproportion” between the finite and the infinite.  In The Symbolism of Evil  Ricoeur 
contends that sin cannot be regarded as the output of any computational model. The 
difficulty with the computational paradigm is that ignores the generative character 
of sin in the Hebraic context of the covenant relationship, in the face-to-face 
positioning of the finite creature “before God”, who is most holy and on whose 
countenance one cannot gaze and live. Therefore, sin cannot be described as a 
“debt” so much as the absolute revelation of one’s own mortality, of one’s sheer 
nullity in the presence of the sovereign Deity.  That is what is really implied in Paul’s 
oft-cited statement in Romans that the “wages of sin is death.”18   Here the Greek 
word for “wages” (opsōnia), which occurs only once in the New Testament, does not 
have the connotation of a “salary” so much as “just compensation”. Placed against 
the Hebraic backdrop of Paul’s argument in Romans, the statement conflicts 
dialectically with the second half of the sentence, namely, that “the gift of God is 
eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.”  
According to Ricoeur, there can be no comparison between the “finite moral 
consciousness” and “the witness that the Just One bears to himself.” Hence, both 
the major and minor prophets, Ricoeur insists, are bent not on articulating any kind 
of isonomy between transgressions and “just deserts”, but on condemning the 
debasement of the theme of covenantal fidelity into legalism and compulsive 
ritualism.  The prophetic demand for “justice” constitutes a kind of ethical as well as 
a political “nihilism” 19 , if viewed as a standard of simple nomos.  Such a demand is 
founded on the faith of the finite being in the providential purpose of that Being who 
is totaliter aliter, “wholly other”, the Holy One with whom one makes an 
unbreakable covenant  What the sinner realizes in any forensic setting is not the 
necessity of finding a “just” means of compensating the affronted party, but the 
overwhelming violence – the divine “wrath” – that follows upon a failure to take God 
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seriously.  Throughout the prophetic tradition there can only be one genuine 
modality of sin, and that is the sin of idolatry. Sin is tantamount to a false 
consciousness that leads one to act willfully in contravention of God’s plan or 
purpose. 
The problem of human finitude by Ricoeur’s reckoning, therefore, turns out to 
be the problem of fallibility.  But fallibility is not a sufficient condition for sin.  
Fallibility is that set of circumstances within which one comes to know one’s finite 
condition is precarious, that one is in Hegel’s phraseology für sich rather than an 
sich, that one literally has “options”.   The option of fallibility means that one can 
“choose” to act in a manner that is right, or wrong, holy or unholy, and that one can 
judge one’s own conduct accordingly.  Sin, or “evil,” so far as Ricoeur is concerned, 
requires an act of will.  That is true even with original sin, where individual acts 
replicate the sin and “fall” of the first human being whose “genetic code” we 
invariably carry forward with us.  Sin must be willed, or “posited.” Ricoeur presses 
the point that “to say that man is fallible is to say that the limitation peculiar to a 
being who does not coincide with himself is the primordial weakness from which 
evil arises. And yet evil arises from this weakness only because it is posited.”20   
 
The thesis of sin as a “posit”, as gratuitous act of “free will”, throws into relief 
the larger question of sin as “injustice” or adikia.   Sin, according to this 
interpretation, directs our attention toward a precipitous and perilous instability in 
the order of things.   It is a delicate situation in which lone, “prideful” behavior is 
capable of unleashing a disastrous chain of events.  In that respect there is less of 
a discrepancy between the Christian and the Greek tragic portrayal of human 
destiny afflicted by hamartia.  Outsize, destructive consequences painfully await 
them.  But the “posit” of sin has less to do with disrupting a balance than with a 
collision of wills that casts in a new light the very meaning of sovereignty.  As Carl 
Schmitt underscored in his framing of a “political theology”, sovereignty comes 
down to who has the ability, as well as the legitimacy, to will what is wholly outside 
the ordo rerum.   What the sovereign “wills,” according to Schmitt, is the 
Ausnahmezustand, the “state of exception.”  The sovereignty of the sovereign 
mirrors the illimitable power of the divine creator.  Schmitt’s political theology, 
therefore, countermands virtually everything implied in the Western historical 
tradition by the term “political.”  There can be no dikiaosyne that coincides, as in 
Plato’s case, with the idealized polis.  There can be no politeia of sovereignty.  
Sovereignty is a “constitutional” moment, an infinitely replicative authorial event 
that determines what we mean by the “political”.   
Walter’s Benjamin’s proposition that there is always a “founding violence” to 
the state (rechtsetzende Gewalt) turned the Greek philosophical construct of 
politeia on its head.  Whereas Schmitt aimed in the wake of the collapse of the 
German monarchy at the end of World War I to make a case for a return to some 
kind of autocracy, Benjamin was far more interested in offering a metapolitical 
justification for the revolutionary violence rearing its head all across Europe in the 
early 1920s and signaling a massive upheaval in the world political order.  In his 
important essay Kritik zur Gewalt (“Critique of Violence”), published two years after 
the initial edition of Schmitt’s Political Theology, Benjamin expounded on the 
essential and provocative question of the role that “violence” of necessity plays in 
the interplay of “law and justice.”  Although a naïve English reader might presume 
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the title of the essay entails a “criticism” of violence as an act of the state, 
Benjamin’s motives differ considerably.  For Benjamin, “violence” (Gewalt) is 
indispensable to both the origin and the preservation of the state itself.  Benjamin’s 
own argument is sharpened when one takes into account the more complicated and 
nuanced semantic values that the German term Gewalt allows.  Gewalt can be 
translated not only as “violence” but as “force.”   Clearly, the formation and 
maintenance of the state requires a coercive constraint.   The continuation of the 
state depends on what we understand as its “police” function whereby the ability of 
the polis to enforce its own laws is enabled.  Whether the laws of the state are 
“just” remains an open question.  Benjamin contends that lawfulness (Recht) and 
justice (Gerechtigkeit) do not necessarily overlap with each other.  The justice of 
laws can only be ascertained through their implementation over time.  In a word, 
justice is a long-term project. It is not inherently an attribute of the state itself 
which has little to do with morality and the administration of “justice”.  “Violence” 
per se has is only a means to its maintenance. The issue remains “whether 
violence, as a principle, could be a moral means even to just ends.”  If the matter is 
to be settled, one must “discriminate within the sphere of means themselves, 
without regard for the ends they serve.”21   
At the same time, Benjamin adamantly opposes anarchic violence of any 
variety.  “All violence as a means is either lawmaking (rechtsetzend) or law-
preserving (rechterhaltend).  If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits 
all validity.”22  Revolutionary violence, however, should not be confused with 
anarchic violence, since it arises from an entirely different directive.  It is the 
directive of history itself and thus manifests as “divine violence” (göttliche Gewalt), 
which is at the same time a prerogative of “sovereign” (waltend) violence.  It is a 
violence that remains “outside the law”, bringing about the very “abolition of state 
power” from which the force of law (Recht) itself emanates.  Revolution is the 
violence upon which “a new historical epoch is founded.”23  
Here Benjamin seeks to conflate his Marxism with his instinctive Jewish 
messianism, which serves as the locus criticus for Derrida’s later effort to identify 
Recht with what is “deconstructible” and Gerechtigkeit, or “justice”, with the 
principle of deconstruction itself.24 Both Benjamin and Derrida unselfconsciously 
engage in their own performative hermeneutic that brings to light a curious 
reciprocity in Judaic thinking between mishpat and tsaddik, as the irresolvable and 
thus “undeconstructible” strain of vengeance versus mercy.  The traditional 
“judicial” depiction of sin as an “injustice” (adikia) against God and derivatively It 
against other human beings hinges summarily on this very reciprocity and tension.  
The theological question of sin and the political conundrum of what constitutes 
“justice” thus fuse into the more expansive challenge concerning whether there can 
be any sustainable or meaningful criteria for how human beings should live 
together other than as a people “before God.”   
In the present era when the rage for “justice” by those who have been 
historically wronged, as well as their contemporary advocates and allies, has spun 
out a burgeoning` industry of collective fault-finding and blame assignment with the 
aim of sanctioning what often appears to be anarchic violence, the most reasonable 
recourse can no longer be seen as a refurbishing of the social contract that 
grounds what we know as “democracy,” but as a radical new variation of a political 
theology that realigns polis with theos in a manner that cannot in any shape or form 
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be confused with a “theocracy.”  We can only imagine it as a political theology 
without theology, as a cry of the heart for the realization of a new presence of God 
in our midst that joins justice with “loving-kindness” in response to the universal 
and perennial prophetic demand. Such would be a “political theology” that provides 
a nod to recognition for the durability of divine sovereignty without the trappings of 
authoritarianism, or autocracy.  It would be a political theology of the basileia to 
theou in the most poignant sense of the word.  It would be one in which the dialectic 
of sin and grace was thoroughly reconceived as the mutually facing countenances 
of divine justice, which at the same time would be revered in the annals of a 
universal political democracy as justice” for “all”, and justice once and for all. 
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